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Abstract 
 
Citizens’ opinions in authoritarian countries are overlooked in the current research 
on authoritarian regimes. It is also hard to elicit the true opinions of the citizens because 
they might fear the consequences of disclosure and they might be unwilling to report 
socially undesirable opinions. Researchers question the surveys conducted in 
authoritarian countries, and worry about the possible “self-censorship” in those countries. 
In this paper, I applied a survey technique named list experiment to answer whether 
citizens in authoritarian countries censor their opinions towards sensitive questions, what 
kinds of issue could be sensitive and what kinds of people tend to self-censor. Based on 
my experiment in the capital of China, people do censor themselves, especially with 
regard to fundamental political issues. People are more willing to reveal true opinions 
towards economic issues. Among different subgroups, elderly people, probationary CCP 
members, and government employees tend to censor themselves more.    
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1. Introduction  
After two decades focusing on democratization, the study of authoritarianism has 
recently gained more attention and become one of the hottest topics in both comparative 
politics and international relations. We have gained knowledge of political institutions, 
like parties and elections, in authoritarian countries (Gandhi, 2008; Wright, 2008; Gandhi 
& Lust, 2009;  Malesky & Schuler, 2010; Landry, et al., 2010; Malesky, et al., 2012),  
authoritarian  survival (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; George, 2007; Svolik, 2012), 
popular movements in authoritarian countries (Kuran, 1991;  Robertson, 2007; O’Brien, 
1996; Li, 2008), and different types of authoritarian regimes’ conflict behavior (Bueno de 
Mesquita & Siverson, 1995; Weeks, 2012).  
However, in the current literature, researchers mostly focus on the study of elites 
while citizens in authoritarian countries are important to its rule. Citizens in authoritarian 
regimes are important in generating rents, and the rebellions they could launch against 
dictators are a primary threat to authoritarian survival ( Gandhi & Przeworski, 
2006;Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). Identifying threats from outsiders as one of the two 
types of threats to authoritarian rule, researchers find that institutions like parties and 
legislatures contribute to authoritarian survival by helping to make reliable commitment 
to co-opt those outsiders (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012). 
However, we lack empirical evidence to test whether the outsiders or the citizens are 
coopted by the government. 
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Moreover, most studies of authoritarian regimes rely on the assumption of 
complete information and the assumption that the outsiders or the citizens would behave 
collectively as a single opposition group. According to Kuran’s theory on popular 
movements, apart from mass discontent and regime weakness, awareness of other 
peoples’ preferences are important in an individual’s decision of whether or not to reveal 
his or her own private preference (Kuran, 1991). While a person’s private preference 
remains constant, as public opposition grows, there comes a point where his external cost 
of joining the opposition group falls below his internal (psychological) cost of hiding his 
true preference and pretending to support the regime (preference falsification) (Kuran, 
1991). When this switching point is reached, an individual will switch from supporting 
the regime to opposing it in public.  In reality, apart from direct repression and buying off 
the citizens, autocracies make large efforts to block information about public preference 
to prevent collective action. In a study of China’s online censorship, researchers find that 
“the censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments 
that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content.” (King, et al., 
2013)        
          Therefore, the study of authoritarian regimes without studying citizens’ opinions 
and behaviors is incomplete. However, because of the opaque nature of authoritarian 
regimes, it is hard to gain information about citizens’ views and behaviors under 
authoritarian rule. Authoritarian regimes rarely collect or publish data on citizens’ 
opinions and behavior. As citizens’ satisfaction can be considered a measure of the 
officials’ performance, the government has incentive to control the flow of this 
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information or even to fake citizens’ opinions (Cai, 2000). Safety concerns also prevents 
widespread data sharing (Manion, 2008).    
            When survey research itself is sensitive in authoritarian countries, collecting high 
quality data by researchers themselves are difficulty. Because the citizens’ might not be 
willing to reveal their true opinions towards sensitive political issues, survey data 
collected in authoritarian countries are of questionable accuracy. Take China study as an 
example, most surveys do not mention how they deal with the self-censorship and 
researchers failed to justify the accuracy of their data, including Tianjian Shi’s two 
surveys on political altitudes and political behavior of Chinese citizens in 1990 and 1999 
(Shi, 1999), Pierre Landry’s 2003/2004 survey on the institutionalization of legal reform 
in China (Landry, 2009), and Martinez-Bravo et al.’s village democracy survey 
(Martinez-Bravo, et al., 2012).  
           To gain accuracy, some researchers carefully designed their questionnaires to 
avoid taboo issues, and some of them even did preliminary research first to find out what 
issues are too sensitive (Tsai, 2010; Dickson, 2010). Conversational interviews are also 
recommended and used to gain trust from respondents to elicit their true opinions 
(Lianjiang, 2013; Wang, et al., 2013;Tsai, 2010;Tsai, 2007). Although conversational 
interview can help researchers to build closer relationship with their respondents and give 
the respondents chances to justify their behavior, it cannot guarantee that the respondents 
are willing to express their true opinions, instead of saying things that the government or 
the researchers want to hear, especially when the fear of disclosure remains and when the 
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researchers are cooperating with official institutions. The conversations between the 
researcher and the respondents may also lead the respondents to respond in a certain way. 
Simply avoiding sensitive issue cannot help us to understand citizens’ opinions towards 
sensitive issues and whether and why certain group of people might hide their true 
opinions.      
This paper attempts to shed lights on the study of citizens’ views and behaviors 
under authoritarian rule. In this paper, by using an indirect questioning technique, I first 
examine whether citizens hide their true opinions when answering survey questions. Then 
I analyze what kinds of people tend to hide their true opinions more.  
 The reminder of this paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, I 
explain the meaning of “sensitive questions” and possible reasons citizens may hide their 
true opinions. I also explain why we might observe “self-censorship” in authoritarian 
regimes and give hypotheses about different types of people’s responses. In the second 
section, I describe the indirect questioning method, list experiment, used in my survey, 
and also describe the survey I conducted. In the third section, I present the data analysis 
and results. Finally, I conclude by reviewing key findings and listing some possible 
future research based on this project.   
 
2. Possible “self-censorship” in Authoritarian Regimes 
A question is sensitive if (1) it could be seen as an invasion of privacy, like 
questions about sexuality and income; or (2) it raises fears of the consequences of 
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disclosure of the answer (threat of disclosure); or (3) it elicits answers that are socially 
unacceptable or socially undesirable (social desirablity bias)(Tourangeau & Yan, 2007).  
In most cases, the threat of disclosure and the social desirability bias are combined.  
Respondents worry about the disclosure because the behaviors or opinions they hold are 
socially unacceptable, for instance hatred towards a certain ethnic group.  
In authoritarian countries, apart from worrying about “punishment” from the 
society, respondents might also worry about punishment from the government. In 
Chinese history, “literary inquisition” was common in all dynasties.  If people said or 
wrote something that could be considered offensive to the regime or the emperor, they 
and their whole family could be imprisoned or even be killed. A recent and well-known 
case of “literary inquisition” in China is the Cultural Revolution. Any words or behavior 
that could be interpreted as “capitalist” or anti-revolution could lead to the loss of 
freedom or life. Although people today enjoy much more freedom in China than before, 
they can still get into trouble because of what they say or write.  
In authoritarian countries, it is even hard to tell what kinds of opinions are really 
socially unacceptable. Because of the fear of government punishment, the lack of free 
media, and the online censorship, it is hard for the citizens in authoritarian countries to 
know about the true preferences of other people, especially those people who share 
different backgrounds and to whom they have no private connection. Without knowing 
their peers’ preferences, it is safest to report behaviors or opinions that follow the 
government’s propaganda. 
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            Because citizens’ concern could include both government’s punishment and 
society’s punishment in authoritarian regimes, I use the word “self-censorship” to 
describe the unwillingness to reveal a true opinion, instead of “social desirability bias.” 
            Different people might be different in how much they worry about the “threat of 
disclosure” based on whether they have something to hide and based on their sense of 
vulnerability to “punishment” from the government and society. Some hypotheses based 
on the social-economic factors are presented below:      
Demographic Hypotheses 
H1: Elderly people tend to censor themselves more 
Elderly people experienced more political events that might make them feel more 
vulnerable. In the China case, people older than 50 experienced Cultural Revolution and 
they observed how society violently punished individuals and groups with unacceptable 
opinions. To protect themselves, it is wise to think twice before saying or doing anything, 
and it is wise to follow the mainstream idea. People older than 40 directly or indirectly 
experienced the Tian’an Men Square Protests and observed the cost of publicly protesting 
against the government. In contrast with previous generations, younger generations were 
born after China’s reform and have witnessed few or no violent confrontment between 
the government and the citizens or the confrontment among citizens. To them, the 
possible punishments from government and society are far from their life, they thus have 
less pressure to conceal their true opinions. 
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H2: Communist party members and probationary party members tend to give 
more positive support to the government, but will censor themselves less in government 
related issues 
Party in authoritarian countries is perceived as an instrument of co-optation and 
control (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2012; Svolik, 2012). As an 
instrument of control, party helps autocracies to gain political control over appointments 
and selective recruitment and repression (Svolik, 2012). Due to their career aspirations, 
party members have more incentive to show positive support for the government. 
Because the members and probationary members either have gained benefit from the 
Party or anticipate future benefit, they could have a higher evaluation to the government. 
Therefore, they have less negative opinion to hide.     
H3: Communist party members and probationary party members tend to censor 
themselves more in value/moral related issues 
It is a “requirement” for CCP members to hold a higher moral standard and to 
always behave as model for other citizens. CCP members could get punished by the 
government for their immoral behaviors if these behaviors are exposed. Therefore, CCP 
members and probationary CCP members will be more sensitive to other peoples’ 
expectations. They have more incentive to hide any behaviors or attitudes that might be 
considered undesirable.  
H4: People who work for the government tend to more positive support to the 
government, but will censor themselves less 
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This is driven by the same mechanism described in hypothesis 3 about CCP 
members and probationary CCP members.  
H5: People with higher educational backgrounds will tend to censor themselves 
more 
People with high education usually have more access to information because they 
are able to read and communicate in different languages and to use high technology. 
Because of this, they tend to be exposed to more diverse sets of values. They are also 
more likely to be able to travel between different countries. Their ability and experience 
could help them to compare their country with other regimes and to evaluate the regime 
and the society from different angels.  Therefore, it is likely that they will hold opinions 
different from those advocated by the government.  
 
3. Method 
3.1 The List Experiment  
To elicit truthful answers to sensitive questions, a technique called list experiment 
(sometimes called the item count technique) was used. The list experiment has been used 
in psychology to study sensitive issues like drug use and sexual behavior for more than 
forty years (Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). In recent years, list experiment has gained more 
popularity in political science. Some political scientists have successfully adjusted this 
technique for political science study, and developed new statistical methods for 
examining multivariate relationships efficiently(Glynn, 2013; Blair & Imai, 2012).  
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Political scientists have also successfully used list experiments to study corruption 
(Gingerich, 2010), voter turnout (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010), and vote buying 
(Gonzalez‐Ocantos, et al., 2012).  
The list experiment works by indirect questioning. First, a sample is randomly 
divided into two groups. Each group is asked the same question, and given several 
options to choose from. Instead of asking them to answer directly, the researcher asks the 
respondents to report only the number of options they agree with. The only difference 
between the treatment and control groups is the number of options they are given. For 
example, the question could be: Among the following statements, how many 
statements you agree with? The options listed for the control group could be: 
 Income inequality and corruption problems exist in all countries, and it is normal 
that our country has these problems too. 
 The flaws of our political system make the cadres more easily corrupted. 
 Corruption is a personal problem of the cadres, instead of the design of a political 
system. 
 To solve the current social problems, everyone has responsibility and should 
participate. 
All respondents receive the four options listed above. However, the treatment 
group receives one more option that is the “sensitive item” we are interested in: 
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 Though there are a lot of problems in China now, the current political system is 
the most suitable one for China 
Because the respondents only need to answer the number of statements they agree 
with, this technique provides the respondents with a high degree privacy and protection. 
Neither the researchers nor other persons can identify the specific preference of a 
respondent, so there is no need to hide his or her true opinions towards the sensitive 
items.  
Because the respondents are randomly assigned to two groups, we should expect 
them to have the same response towards the same “non-sensitive” options on average. 
Therefore, by simply compare the means of each group, we can derive the proportion of 
respondents who agree that the current system is the most suitable one for China. If no 
one thinks the current system is the most suitable one for China, there should be no 
difference in the average numbers reported by each group. If the mean of the numbers 
reported by the control group is 3.2, and the mean of the numbers reported by the 
treatment group is 3.5, we can say that about 30% of respondents agree that the current 
political system is the most suitable for China.   
 
3.2 Survey Description  
With this list experiment technique in hand, I conducted an independent face-to-
face survey in Beijing, China with the help of nine college students between December 
23
rd 
2013 and January 22
th
 2014. The questionnaires were given to passengers in Beijing 
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Subway. 53 subway stations were chosen randomly from 201 non-transfer stations in 16 
Beijing subway lines
1
. These stations range from suburban areas to the center of Beijing 
and therefore represent a variety of different neighborhoods. Because the subway is the 
fastest means of transportation and it is very cheap and comfortable, it is the most popular 
choice for citizens to travel within the city. The respondents we surveyed from the 53 
stations are representative of the large population of low to middle class citizens. 906 
questionnaires were collected in total.  
Because I am also interested in whether the citizens censor themselves, I added a 
normal questionnaire asking respondents to answer sensitive questions directly in 
addition to the two questionnaires using the list experiment technique. The three 
questionnaires were given to different people from the same station at the same time 
every day. An example question in the normal questionnaire would be: 
Do you agree that though there are a lot of problems in China now, the 
current political system is the most suitable one for China? 
A. Agree     B. Disagree  
            The following six sensitive items, phrased here as declarative statements, were 
included in each questionnaire: 
1) Whether Diaoyu Island belongs to China has nothing to do with my life. 
                                                     
1 Transfer stations are excluded, because usually they are the busiest stations and there are no space for the 
respondents to answer the questionnaire.  
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2) Though there are a lot of problems in China now, the current political system is 
the most suitable one for China. 
3) Reports about President Xi’s and Prime Minister Wen’s large private wealth are 
probably true. 
4) The government has the legal power to censor the internet. 
5) The government can adjust its policies to satisfy peoples’ demands. 
6) My house should belong to me forever and I should have the right to decide 
whether to sell my own house. 
Because there’s no existing theory on what kinds of questions are sensitive in 
China, and identifying these issues is one of the goals of this research, the six “sensitive 
items” in the survey range from international issues to domestic issues, and from more 
fundamental issues to specific policy issues.    
Because some bias from the questionnaires in China could be caused by different 
understandings of abstract ideas like “democracy”, most sensitive items in my 
questionnaires are about views towards certain facts. The sentences containing abstract 
items about political system and government policies are taken from politics text books in 
Chinese schools, and have long been the government’s “slogan,” so we should expect no 
miss-understanding of those sentences. 
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Seven demographic questions are also included in each questionnaire for research 
interests, and assessing balance between groups. These questions include gender, race, 
residency, age, party membership, education, and occupation.  
 
4. Data Analysis and Results from List experiment   
In this section, I first compare the difference between indirect measure (list 
experiment) and direct measure to see whether citizens censor themselves. I also compare 
responses to different questions to see what kinds of questions might be more sensitive. 
Then I analyze the contribution of different characteristics to respondent’s response to see 
what kind of people tend to self-censor more. Because simply comparing means cannot 
examine the relationships between respondents’ characteristics and their responses to 
sensitive items, in the data analysis I used Blair and Imai’s methods and R package2 
(Blair & Imai, 2012) which provides efficient multivariate regression method for my 
three groups research design with two groups using list experiment and one group using 
regular questionnaires.    
 
4.1 Do citizens Self-censor? 
The first step is to estimate the proportion of people who agree with each sensitive 
item in the list experiment. The next step is to estimate the proportion of people agreeing 
with the same sensitive items when being asked directly. Two groups of estimations were 
                                                     
2 For more details, please check Blair & Imai, 2012,  Imai, 2011, and package “list”. 
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derived from two separate logistic models. Finally, to measure the extent to which the 
respondents hide their true opinions towards the sensitive items, I estimate the differences 
in response to the list experiment and direct asked questionnaires.  
A logistic model was used to estimate the “true proportion” of people agreeing 
with the sensitive item in list experiment, and another logistical model was used to 
estimate the proportion in direct asked questionnaire. The differences between the two 
proportions were estimated via Monte Carlo simulations based on the two logit models. 
Because the residency, age and occupation are unbalanced across groups, they are 
controlled in both models
3. Because there’s no existing theory about what characteristic 
might influence peoples’ willingness to tell their true opinion, no other independent 
variables were included in the two logistic models. The estimates here represent the 
proportion of the population as a whole. In the next section, different characteristics were 
added to the model as independent variables to check their contribution to people’s 
response to sensitive items.  
If citizens censor themselves, I should observe a difference between the estimates 
from list experiment and direct asked questioning. If we consider the government 
advocated value as socially desirable opinions, and if the citizens do worrying about the 
“punishment” from government and society, we should observe more of them disagree 
with statement one in the direct asked questionnaire, and therefore show high interests in 
the Diaoyu Island issue. We should observe more people report that they think the current 
                                                     
3 Demographic information of each group is showed in Appendix 
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political system is the most suitable one for China and they think the government can 
adjust its polity to satisfy the peoples’ demands. Information about leadership in China 
has long been censored, so we should observe a large amount of people disagree with 
statement 3 about top leaders’ private wealth. We should also observe more people agree 
with online censorship in direct asked questionnaire. After economic reform, discussion 
about economy is always hot. People are exposed to debate about economic reform in TV 
and online. They might feel safe to reveal their opinion towards statement 6 about 
property right, and we might not see big difference between the list experiment and the 
direct asked questionnaire.  
 As I mentioned in section two, the “fear of disclosure” is also influenced by 
whether the respondent has something to hide, so if citizens’ true opinions are the same 
as the socially desirable view, they have no need to censor themselves. In this case, we 
will see no difference between the list experiment and the direct asked questionnaire. 
The results are showed in Table 1 with the first column presenting the results 
from the list experiment, the second column presenting the results from the direct asked 
questionnaire, and the third column showing the difference between the list experiment 
and the direct asked questionnaire. These results are visualized in Figures 1-6 with each 
figure corresponding to one of the six sensitive questions. 
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Table 1. Responses to List Experiment and Direct Asked Questions 
 List Experiment  Direct Difference 
Q1.Diaoyu Island 15.59%** 9.97%** 5.63% 
Q2.Political System 52.57%*** 72.3%*** -19.72%* 
Q3. Leaders’ 
Wealth 
38.64%*** 55.89%*** -17.25%* 
Q4. Online 
Censorship 
58.25%*** 62.03%*** -3.78% 
Q5. Satisfaction 
towards Policy 
62.7%*** 72.7%*** -10% 
Q6. Property Rights 51.14%*** 87.46%*** -36.32%*** 
Note:  Values in List Experiment column are estimated differences in means between 
control and treatment groups. Values in Direct column are estimated proportion of people 
agreeing with the sensitive items. Values in Difference are the differences between list 
experiments and directed asked questionnaires. *p<0.05 for differences between list experiments 
and direct asked questionnaires in political system issue and leaders’ wealth issue. ***p<0.001 
for difference in property rights issue. The differences between list experiments and direct asked 
questionnaires in Diaoyu Island issue, online censorship issue and satisfaction towards policy 
issue are not statistically different.   
 17 
From Table 1, the estimated proportions of people agreeing with the sensitive 
items in the list experiment are all statistically significant when compared to the null 
hypothesis of 0% agreement, and they all differ from the estimated proportions of people 
agreeing with the sensitive items taking direct asked questionnaires.  However, the 
difference between list experiment and direct questionnaire varies between different 
sensitive items. This may reveal different sensitivity levels for different topics. 
Before comparing sensitive items, I first discuss the result of each sensitive item. Figure 1 
to 6 plot the estimated proportion of people who agree with each sensitive item. In each 
figure, the point estimates from the two logistic regression models are presented with 
solid circles. 95% confidence intervals shown in vertical lines are obtained via Monte 
Carlo simulations. 
4.1.1 Diaoyu Island issue 
 
Figure 1. Responses to Question 1  
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As I expected, the estimated proportion of people agreeing with statement 1 in 
direct asked questionnaire is lower than in list experiment. In the list experiment, 15.59% 
people agree that whether Diaoyu Island belongs to China has nothing to do with their 
life. We can perceive that 15.59% people don’t care about Diaoyu Island issue. When 
asked directly about their opinion towards this issue, only 9.97% people are willing to 
reveal that they do not care much about this issue. If we consider 15.59% as the true 
proportion of people holding the opinion that they do not care about Diaoyu Island, when 
asked directed, more than 1/3 of them are too scared to reveal their true opinion.  
The 84.41% of people who do not agree with the sensitive item includes people 
who disagree with the sensitive item and people who are not sure about it, the proportion 
of people “self-censored” in this issue might be higher than the difference we can observe 
here which are 5.63%. Note that 0% is contained within our 95% confidence interval. 
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4.1.2 Opinion towards Current Political System 
 
Figure 2. Responses to Question 2 
The result in question 2 also follows my expectation, although in both 
measurements the proportion of people thinking the current political system is the most 
suitable one is large. 52.57% people think the current political system is most suitable 
one for China based on the list experiment, while 72.3% would report they think so when 
asked directly. The 19.72% difference is very large and statistically significant. About 1/3 
of the people who disagree with the sentence would not be willing to tell the truth in 
direct asked questionnaire. A large amount of people would hide their negative opinion 
towards the current political system.  
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4.1.3 Opinion towards Leaders 
 
Figure 3. Responses to Question 3 
In this question, we saw more people responded to the sensitive item in the direct 
asked questionnaire than in the list experiment which I did not expect. When taking the 
list experiment questionnaires, 38.64% people respond that they think the reports about 
President Xi’s and Prime Minister Wen’s large private wealth are probably true. When 
taking the direct asked questionnaires, 55.89% people respond so. Because opinion 
towards this issue needs background about the New York Times’ and Bloomberg News’ 
reports, both of which are censored in China, large amount of people may never have 
heard of this kind of these reports. It is very possible that a lot people are not sure about 
this statement, so they choose to not respond to this item in taking the list experiment 
questionnaires. It seems without knowing news papers’ reports, a lot of people are still 
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willing to believe the top leaders in China have large private wealth, and they feel 
comfortable to reveal this opinion to a stranger.  
 
4.1.4 Online Censorship 
 
Figure 4. Responses to Question 4 
 
There’s almost no difference between the list experiment and the direct asked 
questionnaire in this issue. In the list experiment measure, 58.25% people think the 
government has the legal power to censor the internet, while 62.03% people think so in 
the direct measure. In both measurements, the proportion of people agreeing with the 
item is high. And there’s only 3.78% difference between the two measurements. It seems 
more than half of the citizens think it is legitimate for the Chinese government to censor 
the internet. The people who disagree with this do not feel pressure to reveal their true 
opinion.  
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4.1.5 Satisfaction towards Government  
 
Figure 5. Responses to Question 5 
The sensitive item in question 5 asks whether you think the government can 
adjust its policies to satisfy peoples’ demand which has long being a “slogan” among all 
levels of government in China. 62.7% of people in the list experiment measure agree that 
the government can adjust its policy to satisfy people’s demand, while 72.7% people 
agree so in direct measure. There’s a 10% difference between the two measurements 
which is not statistically significant. As expected, about 1/4 of the people who disagree 
with this government “slogan” are unwilling to express their true opinion.  
 
4.1.6 Property Rights 
This question asks people’s opinion towards ownership of house.  Individuals in 
China only have right to use their land or apartment for 70 years or less. Whether citizens 
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should be allowed land and home-ownership rights is a hot topic of debate in China is in 
hot debate in China. When asked indirectly whether they agree that a house should 
belong to its owner forever and whether they should have the right to decide whether to 
sell their own house, 51.14% of people agree so. However, when being asked directly, 
more than 80% of people think they should have the right to own their house and the 
right to decide whether to sell their own house. There may be a large number of people 
who are unsure about this issue, and would not respond it in the list experiment. When 
asked directed and they have to choose between agree or disagree, most of them choose 
to agree. Thus, it seems likely this is not a real sensitive issue.  
 
Figure 6. Responses to Question 6 
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4.2 What kind of issue is more sensitive? 
The six sensitive items can be divided into difference groups. Basically, it can be 
divided into two groups: foreign policy issues and domestic issues, with Diaoyu Island 
issue in the foreign policy category and the other five in the domestic category. The five 
domestic issues can be further divided into two groups: fundament issues (political 
system) and policy issues (online censorship, satisfaction towards policy, property 
rights), or can be divided into other two groups: political issues (political system, 
satisfaction towards government policies, online censorship) and economic issues 
(property rights).  
If we rank the sensitiveness of an issue based on the difference between direct and 
indirect measure, the rank of the six issues in the research would be: political system > 
satisfaction towards government policies > Diaoyu Island > online censorship > property 
rights. When we only use the difference between direct and indirect questioning to 
measure the sensitive level, we actually consider both the need to hide and the pressure to 
hide true opinions. More sensitive items, given this measure, are those for which more 
people hold the undesirable opinion and more people are unwilling to reveal the truth.  
If we only measure the pressure people get to tell truth, we can rank the sensitivity 
level of an issue based on the proportion of people unwilling to tell true when they hold 
undesirable opinions. In this measurement, the sensitivity level of political system and 
Diaoyu Island is almost equal with the political system issue being slightly more 
sensitive.  
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People are least willing to tell their true opinion towards fundament political issue 
(political system). Compared to the fundamental issue, people are more likely to tell their 
true opinion towards specific government policies. People are more willing to reveal their 
true opinions towards foreign policy issues than fundamental domestic issues, but are less 
willing to reveal true opinion towards foreign policy issues than specific domestic policy 
issues.  
 
4.3 Who tends to self-censor?  
In this section, I examine four demographic factors that might have important 
influence on peoples’ responses to sensitive items. Graphs that show point estimates and 
uncertainty of each predictor (sub-group of people) to the four sensitive items are 
presented
4
. In estimating each demographic factor, the other controlled factors are set as 
constant in their median levels.  
 
                                                     
4 Because in previous analysis there seems are no social desirability bias in leader’s private wealth and 
property rights, I didn’t include these two issues in analyzing different characteristic’s contribution to social 
desirability bias.  
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4.3.1 Age  
 
Figure 7. Estimated responses from different age group 
With the y-axis shows the proportion of agreeing with a certain sensitive item, 
Figure 7 presents different age groups’ responses to sensitive items. The young age group 
contains people from 18 to 28. The middle age represents people from 29 to 39. 
Respondents older than 40 are aggregated to the old group.  
Based on the Hypothsis one, I expect the difference between list experiment and 
direct asked question is the largest in old group. And the results confirm this 
expectation.As can be seen in the figure 7, the differences between list experiment and 
direct asked questionnaire are the largest of old group people in three of the four sensitive 
issues. People who are older than 40 is least likely to tell their true opinion towards 
Diaoyu Island issue, political system issue and satisfaction towards government policy. 
There is no difference between list experiment and direct measurement in the online 
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censorship issue in old people group which might be caused by using internet less. In 
both political system issue and satisfaction towards government policy, older group’s 
favorable towards current system and government is the least among the three age groups 
in list experiment. But in direct asked questionnaire, they show the highest supportive to 
the system and government.  
The response of young group in political system issue is not expected. In the 
political system issue, although only little amount of young people think the current 
political system is most suitable one for China in the list experiment, a large proportion of 
them report so in direct asked questionnaire. A large amount of young people would hide 
their true opinion towards political system issue. There’s almost no difference between 
young and middle age group in their opinion towards other issues. 
 
4.3.2 Party Membership 
Based on hypothesis 2, I expect that a large proportion of CCP members and 
probationary members agree that the current political system is the most suitable one for 
China in both list and directed asked questionnaire. The proportion of CCP members and 
probationary members agreeing with this item is expected to be higher than people who 
are not CCP members. And there is less difference between the list experiment and the 
direct asked questionnaire among CCP members and probationary members. Their 
response to whether the government can adjust its policy to satisfy people’s demand 
should be the same as in political system issue. 
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Based on hypothesis 3, I expect that in the Diaoyu Island issue the difference 
between list experiment and direct asked questionnaire among CCP members and 
probationary members are higher than non CCP members.  
The results presented in Figure 8 shows the responses of CCP members and 
probationary CCP members are quite different, and my expectations are partly supported.  
 
Figure 8. Estimated responses from people holding different CCP membership 
As can be seen in figure 8, in Diaoyu Island Issue, probationary CCP members are 
most likely to hide their true opinion. Although in list experiment they show the least 
interest in the Diaoyu Island issue, they show very high interest in directed asked 
questionnaire. In contrast, the large amount of CCP members show interest in Diaoyu 
Island issue, and thus have no need to lie. At least probationary members show they want 
to be seen as they have higher moral standard. The less difference in CCP members group 
in this issue cannot be seen as evidence that CCP members are more willing to reveal 
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their true opinion. It is because most CCP members already hold the socially desired 
opinion in this issue.  
In the political system issue, although the proportions of supporting the current 
political system are very close in list experiment, a large amount of probationary CCP 
members are unwilling to reveal their true opinion which makes them the most 
supportive group in direct asked questionnaire.  While in list experiment the estimated 
proportion of probationary CCP member who think the current political system is the 
most suitable one for China is the smallest, the proportion of probationary CCP members 
who agree so is the largest in direct asked questionnaire. It seems probationary CCP 
members might feel more vulnerable in their political career and more vulnerable to the 
other people’s expectation. CCP members show the highest support to the system in list 
experiment which is consistent with my expectation. 
In the online censorship issue and the satisfaction towards government policy 
issue, there’s no much difference between list experiment and directed asked 
questionnaire among each group, and there is no much difference across groups in the 
sense of “self-censorship”. However, the difference between CCP members and 
probationary CCP members’ response in the Satisfaction issue is big. In the satisfaction 
issue, the estimated proportion of probationary CCP members agreeing that the 
government can adjust policy to satisfy people’s demand is the highest which is 
consistent with hypothesis 2. In contrast, CCP members tend to be more critical in this 
issue.  
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4.3.3 Occupation   
Different jobs are aggregated into five types, and four of them are added as 
dummy variables in the two models with Enterprise as excluded category. Farmer and 
migrant workers are aggregated as farmer group. Students are one group. Government, 
party organ and national institution are aggregated as government group. State owned 
enterprises are one group. All the other types of enterprises, including private enterprises, 
foreign enterprises and individual business, are aggregated as enterprise group.  
Based on hypothesis 4, I expect that the estimate proportion of government and 
state owned enterprises employees agreeing with the political system issue and 
satisfaction more in list experiment, and thus smaller differences between list experiment 
and direct asked questionnaire. However, government employees’ response to political 
system issue is not what I expected. 
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Figure 9.  Estimated responses from people owning different occupation 
In political system issue, farmer group, government group and enterprise group all 
show lower support to the current political system in list experiment. They all show very 
high support to the current political system in direct asked questionnaire. The government 
group shows the highest extent to hide their true opinion towards the current political 
 32 
system. State owned enterprise group shows the highest support the current political 
system. There’s no big difference among different occupation group in other issues.  
It seems the government employees are more critical in the political system issue, 
while employees in State owned enterprises are more supportive to the current political 
system. Although these two groups both benefit from the system, government employees 
have more experience and knowledge of how this system works. It might be why the 
government employees are more critical.  
 
4.3.4 Education  
 
Figure 10. Estimated responses from people with different level of education  
People with higher education show higher interest in Diaoyu Island in list 
experiment, but the extent to which different group willing to express true opinion seems 
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the same. People with higher education are also more critical to the current political 
system in list experiment and are also more likely to hide their true opinion towards this 
issue which is consistent with hypothesis 5. People with higher education are more 
satisfied towards government’s policy. Although there’s little difference between their 
opinions towards government’s online censorship, people with higher education show 
less support to this policy.  
 
5. Conclusion   
This paper shows that the regular survey design with directed asked questions is 
not reliable in authoritarian countries and provides an alternative method to elicit true 
answers from citizens in these countries. By showing that citizens do censor themselves 
in authoritarian countries, this paper also raises questions about the assumption of 
complete information and raises the possibility that the current theory of authoritarian 
survival is incomplete. By creating and promoting certain social values that favor the 
authoritarian rule and by maintaining a strong control of violence and promotion, the 
government can prevent people revealing their true opinions without using overt 
repressive tactics. In this way, the government prevents the outsiders from forming of 
opposition groups.  
This paper shows that the people holding socially undesired opinion may not be 
minority, for example in the political system issue, about half of citizens do not agree that 
the current political system is the most suitable one for China. Even given this large 
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proportion, many people are still unwilling to reveal their true opinions. Of the 50% of 
citizens that hold this negative opinion, just over half are willing to express this opinion 
when asked directly. This paper also opens questions of how citizens in authoritarian 
countries exchange opinions, in what circumstance they are willing to reveal their true 
opinions, and how they would respond when seeing others reveal their true opinions. 
Answers to these kinds of questions will help us better understand collective actions in 
authoritarian countries and authoritarian survival. 
This paper does not answer whether the citizens worry about the government or 
the society when hiding their true opinions. To answer this question, different set of 
carefully designed sensitive items will be needed.    
By using multivariate regression to analyze subgroups, this paper also reveals 
important characteristics that influence a person’s feeling of vulnerability to possible 
“punishment” from the government and society. It shows that older people, probationary 
CCP members, government employees, and people with higher education background 
have more undesired opinions to hide and are more reluctant to reveal their “socially 
unacceptable” opinions. The findings about probationary CCP members support the 
theory that parties are efficient cooptation instrument. Even a big proportion of the 
probationary members do not hold positive views of the regime, the possible future 
benefits of joining the party motivate them to disguise their true opinions and to support 
the regime.  
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This paper also reveals citizens’ true opinions towards the regime, government 
policies, and a border dispute. Overall, more than half of Chinese citizens, or at least 
Beijing citizens, are satisfied with the current regime. Therefore, Chinese government 
does have a majority support. Moreover, according to this study, CCP members and non-
CCP members show almost equal support to the regime. It seems that the majority 
support is not the result of buying off certain groups of outsiders. Instead, it is possible 
that the mass support is gained by providing benefit to the whole society.   
In sum, this paper shows the true opinions of the citizens in China, and shows that 
they do censor themselves. This should lead us to question the validity of past surveys in 
China. It also demonstrates the difficulty for revealing information and forming an 
opposition group in authoritarian countries. This raises questions about collective actions 
in authoritarian countries. Further exploring the possibility that governments might 
intentionally foster a climate in which citizens self-censor will help us to better 
understand the survival of authoritarian regimes.  
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Appendix  
 
Table 2: Demographic information of Group A (treatment group in the list 
experiment) 
Gender Race Residency Age 
Male Female Han Minor Urban Rural 18~28 29~39 40~ 
179 148 304 20 256 70 214 71 42 
CCP Membership Education 
CCP 
member 
Probationary 
member 
Not a 
member 
Lower than 
high school 
High school Undergraduate Graduate 
57 53 212 10 47 225 44 
Occupation 
Farmer Student Government State owned 
enterprise 
Enterprise Other 
28 110 26 35 94 33 
 
 
Table 3. Demographic information of Group B (Control group in the list 
experiment) 
Gender Race Residency Age 
Male Female Han Minor Urban Rural 18~28 29~39 40~ 
172 114 260 27 207 80 143 85 59 
CCP Membership Education 
CCP 
member 
Probationary 
member 
Not a 
member 
Lower than 
high school 
High school Undergraduate Graduate 
61 23 211 18 44 171 53 
Occupation 
Farmer Student Government State owned 
enterprise 
Enterprise Other 
30 110 35 25 108 35 
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Table 4. Demographic information of Group C   
Gender Race Residency Age 
Male Female Han Minor Urban Rural 18~28 29~39 40~ 
131 110 226 16 165 77 139 64 39 
CCP Membership Education 
CCP 
member 
Probationary 
member 
Not a 
member 
Lower than 
high school 
High school Undergraduate Graduate 
47 32 163 15 30 164 33 
Occupation 
Farmer Student Government State owned 
enterprise 
Enterprise Other 
29 69 26 19 74 25 
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